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Abstract We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochas-
tic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller con-
strained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We
consider the same type of constraints as in [1], i.e., player 1 has subscrip-
tion based constraints and player 2, who controls the transition probabilities,
has realization based constraints which can also depend on the strategies of
player 1. Next, we consider a N -player nonzero sum constrained stochastic
game with independent state processes where each player has average cost cri-
terion as discussed in [2]. We show that the stationary Nash equilibria of both
classes of constrained games, which exists under strong Slater and irreducibil-
ity conditions [3], [2], has one to one correspondence with global minima of
certain mathematical programs. In the single controller game if the constraints
of player 2 do not depend on the strategies of the player 1, then the mathe-
matical program reduces to the non-convex quadratic program. In two player
independent state processes stochastic game if the constraints of a player do
not depend on the strategies of another player, then the mathematical pro-
gram reduces to a non-convex quadratic program. Computational algorithms
for finding global minima of non-convex quadratic program exist [4], [5] and
hence, one can compute Nash equilibria of these constrained stochastic games.
Our results generalize some existing results for zero sum games [1], [6], [7].
⋆ A portion of Section 3 (two player case) has been presented in the 8th International
ISDG workshop at University of Padova, Italy on 21-23 July, 2011.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that there is a substantial relationship between game the-
ory and mathematical programming. While it is well known that equilibrium
strategies in two player zero sum matrix games are related to optimal points of
certain linear programs, in 1964, Mangasarian and Stone [8] have shown that
the Nash equilibria of any two player bimatrix game can be obtained from the
global maxima of one quadratic program and this approach can be generalized
in case of any finite number of players. Later Filar et al. [9], generalized this
idea to the infinite horizon stochastic game with finite state space and finite
action spaces of all the players. It has been shown that the stationary Nash
equilibria of any N -player stochastic game with discounted criterion are in
one to one correspondence with the global minima of a certain mathematical
program [9], [10]; so, Nash equilibria of such a stochastic game can be com-
puted via the global minima of one mathematical program. The stochastic
games described in [9], [10] can be viewed as centralized stochastic games.
In such centralized stochastic games all the players jointly control a single
Markov chain and all the players have complete information of the Markov
chain’s state and for taking decision at any time t each player has information
of all the actions previously taken by the players. The review article [11] sum-
marizes various algorithmic aspects of zero sum stochastic games along with
algorithms for nonzero sum stochastic games with special structure (single
controller, etc.). In particular, two player zero sum single controller stochastic
game can be solved by a linear program [12], [10], [13] and the Nash equilibria
of the nonzero sum single controller stochastic game can be obtained from the
global minima of a quadratic program [14].
Since the seminal work of Lloyd S. Shapley [15], stochastic games have come
to constitute an important class of models that can capture game theoretic
issues among the decision makers involved, apart from accounting for random
evolution of the system. The edited volume by Neyman and Sorin [16] has a
nice collection of many articles on stochastic games and their applications. The
book by Filar and Vrieze [10] presents stochastic games as a natural multi-
player generalization of (single player) Markov decision processes and their ap-
plications. Constrained stochastic games are realistic because they can capture
bounds on consumption of resources, but, are also difficult to analyze. In [3]
N -player centralized constrained stochastic games with both discounted and
average cost criterion with finite state and finite action spaces are considered
and it is shown that there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium under strong
Slater condition (irreducibility assumption is also needed in average case). The
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existence of Nash equilibrium for constrained stochastic games when the state
space is countable and action spaces are compact metric space is discussed in
[17]. The characterization of Nash equilibria for general constrained stochastic
games via some mathematical program is not known. To the best of our knowl-
edge there are only some special classes of constrained stochastic games which
can be solved as linear programs. We give a brief description of all these classes
here. The two player zero sum single controller constrained stochastic game
with total expected reward criterion and expected average reward criterion is
considered in [18], [6] respectively. In both [18], [6] only the player who controls
the transition probabilities has constraints on his expected rewards and these
rewards do not depend on the strategies of the other player. Nash equilibrium
of such stochastic games can be computed from optimal solutions of linear
programs. Altman, et al., [1] considered the zero sum constrained stochastic
game with discounted cost criterion where both the players have constraints.
The player who controls the transition probabilities has constraints on his ex-
pected discounted costs as similar in [18], [6] and other player has subscription
based constraints. This class of games also can be solved by linear programs
[1].
Apart from the centralized stochastic games as discussed above, some de-
centralized stochastic games are being considered in the literature recently [7],
[2], [19]. In decentralized stochastic games each player independently controls
his own Markov chain based on his state and actions. In [2], a N -player decen-
tralized constrained stochastic game with average cost criterion is considered
and it is shown that the Nash equilibrium for these games exists in stationary
strategies under the irreducibility and strong Slater condition. In these games
each player controls his own Markov chain and the constraints of each player
depend also on the strategies of all the players. The application of these games
to modeling of wireless network is described in [7], [2], [19]. Two player zero
sum game of this class where the constraints of each player do not depend
on the other player’s strategies is considered in [7]. These games, with both
unichain and multichain structure on the state processes of both the players,
can be solved by linear programs.
In this paper we consider two different classes of constrained stochastic
games. First, we consider a special class of two player nonzero sum centralized
constrained stochastic games which is a single controller constrained stochastic
game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We then consider a
N -player nonzero sum constrained stochastic game with independent state
processes where all the players use average cost criterion as discussed in [2].
The summary of our results are:
1. We consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochas-
tic game with both average and discounted cost criterion, a special class of
centralized constrained stochastic games, with the same type of constraints
as in [1], i.e., player 1 has subscription based constraints and player 2, who
controls the transition probabilities, has realization based constraints. Un-
like the situation in [1] and [6] we consider the case where realization based
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constraints of player 2 depend on the strategies of both the players. It fol-
lows from [3] that there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium under strong
Slater condition (irreducibility assumption is also needed in average case).
We show that the Nash equilibria of this constrained stochastic game can
be obtained from the global minima of one mathematical program. The
converse statement is also true, i.e., from the stationary Nash equilibrium
of these games we can construct a point which is a global minimum of the
corresponding mathematical program.
2. If the constraints of player 2 do not depend on the strategies of player
1, then the mathematical program reduces to the non-convex quadratic
program. For zero sum case the linear programs given in [1], [6] can be
recovered from our quadratic program.
3. We show that the stationary Nash equilibria of N -player nonzero sum
constrained stochastic game with independent state processes [2] can be
obtained from the global minima of a certain mathematical program. The
converse statement is also true, i.e., the stationary Nash equilibrium of
these games, which exists under strong Slater and irreducibility conditions
[2], corresponds to a point which is a global minimum of the corresponding
mathematical program.
4. In two player constrained stochastic game with independent state processes
case, if the constraints of each player do not depend on the other player’s
strategies, then the corresponding mathematical program reduces to the
non-convex quadratic program. The linear program as given in [7] for zero
sum game can be obtained as a special case of our quadratic program.
To derive mathematical programs for both constrained stochastic games we use
the same approach, which is via best response linear programs. We use the fact
that the best response of each player against the fixed strategies of other play-
ers can be obtained by solving a constrained Markov decision model, which, in
turn, can be obtained by solving a linear program [20]. In both the cases due
to some special structure we are able to put all primal-dual pair of linear pro-
grams (one pair for each player) together to form one mathematical program
whose objective function is nonnegative at all feasible points. As the linear
program which gives the optimal strategy in a constrained Markov decision
model is given in terms of occupation measure, our mathematical programs
are in terms of these occupation measures. The Nash equilibrium strategy can
be recovered from occupation measure by a known transformation [20].
There are some methods available for solving non-convex quadratic pro-
gramming problem [4], [21], [22]. The algorithm given in [22] is based on com-
plete enumeration of the faces of the polyhedron and therefore it is not very
efficient while the cutting plane method of [21] seems to be problematic [23].
The algorithm given in [4] to solve quadratic programs terminates in a finite
number of steps. We note that the algorithm of [4] assumes that quadratic
program has a global minimum and this condition is satisfied in our settings.
In [5], one more algorithm based on linear programming with complementarity
constraints approach is given to solve a non-convex quadratic program. This
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algorithm does not assume the quadratic program to be bounded below on fea-
sible set. (If quadratic program is not bounded below, then the algorithm given
in [5] computes a feasible ray on which the quadratic program is unbounded;
otherwise, it finds an optimal solution in finite number of steps). But, in our
case the quadratic programs are bounded below on feasible set and hence
the algorithm given in [4] is applicable to our settings. One can also attempt
to use general purpose nonlinear solvers to solve these non-convex quadratic
programs, but convergence to global minima may not be guaranteed.
We now describe the structure of the rest of our paper. Section 2 contains
the two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with
both average and discounted cost criteria and its mathematical programming
formulation. Section 3 contains N -player constrained stochastic game with
independent state processes with average cost criterion and its mathematical
programming formulation.
2 Single controller constrained stochastic game
We consider two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic
games with both average and discounted cost criterion. We assume that player
2 controls the Markov chain. As similar to [1], player 1 has subscription based
constraints and player 2 has realization based constraints but unlike the case
in [1], [6] the constraints of player 2 can also depend on the strategies of player
1. This class of stochastic game is described by the following objects:
(i) S is finite state space of the game. The generic element of S is denoted
by s.
(ii) γ = (γ(1), γ(2), · · · , γ (|S|)) is a probability distribution over S according
to which initial state is chosen.
(iii) Ai is the finite action set of player i, i = 1, 2, let Ai(s) denotes the set of
actions available to player i when the state is at s, where Ai =
⋃
s∈S A
i(s).
(iv) Define, K =
{
(s, a1, a2) : s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s), a2 ∈ A2(s)
}
and for i = 1, 2,
Ki =
{
(s, ai) : s ∈ S, ai ∈ Ai(s)
}
.
(v) ci : K → R is immediate cost of player i, i = 1, 2. Specifically, ci(s, a1, a2)
is the immediate cost incurred by player i, i = 1, 2, when state is s ∈ S
and actions chosen by player 1 and player 2 are a1 ∈ A1(s) and a2 ∈ A2(s)
respectively. Player i wants to minimize the expected cost involving ci(·),
i = 1, 2.
(vi) d1,ksub : K
1 → R is subscription type cost of player 1. d1,ksub(s, a
1) denotes
subscription cost which player 1 has to pay for using action a1 at state s
for kth service, k = 1, 2, · · · , n1.
(vii) d2,l : K → R is immediate cost of player 2. These d2,l(·) are involved in the
lth, l = 1, 2, · · · , n2, constraint on expected cost of player 2.
(viii) Define, ℘(M) as set of all probability measures over setM . p : K2 → ℘(S)
is transition probability describing the dynamics of the game, where p(s′|s, a2)
is a probability of going to state s′ from state s when player 2 chooses action
a2 ∈ A2(s). We recall that the game is controlled by only player 2.
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(ix) ξ1 =
(
ξ11 , ξ
1
2 , · · · , ξ
1
n1
)T
, ξ2 =
(
ξ21 , ξ
2
2 , · · · , ξ
2
n2
)T
denote the vectors defining
the given bounds of the constraints on both the players.
The game dynamics are as follows. Initially, at time t = 0, the state of the
game is s which is chosen according to initial distribution γ, player 1 chooses
an action a1 ∈ A1(s) and player 2 chooses an action a2 ∈ A2(s) independent
of each other. Player 1 receives an immediate cost of c1(s, a1, a2) and player
2 receives c2(s, a1, a2). Apart from this player 2 receives another immediate
costs {d2,l(s, a1, a2)}, l = 1, 2, · · · , n2, which are involved in the expected
cost functionals of player 2 that are constrained by specified bounds {ξ2l },
l = 1, 2, · · · , n2. Now, the state of the game switches to a new state sˆ ∈ S
at time t = 1 with probability p(sˆ|s, a2). At time t = 1, in state sˆ, player 1
chooses an action aˆ1 ∈ A1(sˆ) and player 2 chooses an action aˆ2 ∈ A2(sˆ) and
receives immediate cost c1(sˆ, aˆ1, aˆ2) and c2(sˆ, aˆ1, aˆ2) respectively, player 2 also
receives immediate costs {d2,l(sˆ, aˆ1, aˆ2)}, l = 1, 2, · · · , n2. The next state of
the game is s˜ ∈ S with probability p(s˜|sˆ, aˆ2). The same thing repeats at state
s˜ and play continues for infinite time horizon.
While transition probabilities depend only on the present state and action
used, action that are used can depend on ‘past’, as in history dependent strate-
gies. Define a history at time t as ht = (s0, a
1
0, a
2
0, s1, a
1
1, a
2
1, · · · , st−1, a
1
t−1, a
2
t−1, st)
where st ∈ S, a
i
t ∈ A
i(st), i = 1, 2, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Let Ht denote the set of
all possible histories of length t. A decision rule ft : Ht → ℘(A
1(st)) (resp.,
gt : Ht → ℘(A
2(st))) of player 1 (resp., player 2) at time t is a function that as-
signs to any history of length t, a probability measure over action set of player
1 (resp., player 2). This means that under decision rule ft (resp., gt), player 1
(resp., player 2) chooses action a1 (resp., a2) with probability ft(ht, a
1) (resp.,
gt(ht, a
2)). The sequence of decision rules is called the strategy of the player.
fh = (f0, f1, · · · , ft, · · · ) and g
h = (g0, g1, · · · , gt, · · · ) denote the strategies of
player 1 and player 2 respectively and are called history dependent (behav-
ioral) strategies.
Let F and G denote the set of all history dependent strategies of player
1 and player 2 respectively. These strategies are called Markovian if at every
decision epoch the decision rule depends only on the current state but the
decision rule can differ at every epoch. A stationary strategy is a Markovian
strategy which does not depend on the time, i.e., at every decision epoch the
decision rule is same. So, for stationary strategy ft = f and gt = g for all t, i.e.,
(f, f, f, · · · ) and (g, g, g, · · · ) are the stationary strategies of player 1 and player
2 respectively. We denote, with some abuse of notations, f and g as stationary
strategies of player 1 and player 2 respectively. Let FS and GS denote the set
of all stationary strategies of player 1 and player 2 respectively. A stationary
strategy f ∈ FS is identified with f =
(
(f(1))T , (f(2))T , · · · , (f (|S|))T
)T
,
where f(s) =
(
f(s, 1), f(s, 2) · · · , f
(
s, |A1(s)|
))T
for all s ∈ S; |M | denotes the
cardinality of set M . Similarly, g is identified with g =
(
(g(1))T , (g(2))T , · · · ,
(g (|S|))T
)T
, where g(s) =
(
g(s, 1), g(s, 2) · · · , g
(
s, |A2(s)|
))T
for all s ∈ S.
For all s ∈ S, f(s, a1) is then the probability of choosing action a1 ∈ A1(s) by
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player 1 and g(s, a2) is probability of choosing action a2 ∈ A2(s) by player 2
when state is s.
This leads to the introduction of vector stochastic process {Xt,A
1
t ,A
2
t}
∞
t=0,
where, Xt denotes the state of the game, A
1
t , the action chosen by player 1
and A2t , the action chosen by the player 2 at time t. An initial distribution
γ together with strategy pair (fh, gh) ∈ F × G defines a unique probability
measure Pγ
fh,gh
on an appropriate probability space with respect to which the
laws of vector stochastic process {Xt,A
1
t ,A
2
t }
∞
t=0 of states and actions can be
defined. The corresponding expectation operator on this probability space is
denoted by Eγ
fh,gh
.
The expected average cost
These costs are average functionals of states and actions of the game and
each player minimizes his cost functionals. For given initial distribution γ and
strategy pair (fh, gh) the expected average cost of player i, i = 1, 2, is defined
as
Ciea(γ, f
h, gh) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
γ
fh,gh
ci(Xt,A
1
t ,A
2
t ) (1)
where ea stands for expected average.
The expected average constraints
The expected average constraints of player 2 are defined by average functionals
of states and actions of the game which are bounded by given reals. For given
initial distribution γ and strategy pair (fh, gh) the expected average costs of
player 2 are defined as
D2,lea (γ, f
h, gh) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
γ
fh,gh
d2,l(Xt,A
1
t ,A
2
t ), ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
D2,lea (·, ·) can capture the average consumption of resource l, l = 1, 2, · · · , n2,
by player 2. The expected average constraints of player 2 are given by
D2,lea (γ, f
h, gh) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2. (2)
A constraint in (2) captures the fact that the average consumption of resource
l by player 2, when player 1 uses strategy fh and player 2 uses strategy gh is
not more than given constant ξ2l , l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
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The expected discounted cost
These costs are discounted functionals of states and actions of the game and
each player minimizes his cost functionals. For given initial distribution γ and
strategy pair (fh, gh) the expected discounted cost of player i, i = 1, 2, is
defined as
Ciβ(γ, f
h, gh) = (1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtE
γ
fh,gh
ci(Xt,A
1
t ,A
2
t ) (3)
where β ∈ [0, 1) is a fixed discount factor.
The expected discounted constraints
The expected discounted constraints of player 2 are defined by discounted
functionals of states and actions of the game which are bounded by given
reals. For given initial distribution γ and strategy pair (fh, gh) the expected
discounted costs of player 2 are defined as
D
2,l
β (γ, f
h, gh) = (1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtE
γ
fh,gh
d2,l(Xt,A
1
t ,A
2
t ), ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
D
2,l
β (·, ·) can capture the discounted cost for the consumption of resource l,
l = 1, 2, · · · , n2, by player 2. The expected discounted constraints of player 2
are given by
D
2,l
β (γ, f
h, gh) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2. (4)
A constraint in (4) captures the fact that discounted cost for the consumption
of resource l by player 2, when player 1 uses strategy fh and player 2 uses
strategy gh is not more than given real ξ2l , l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
Subscription type cost [1]
The subscription type costs of player 1 are defined as in [1]
D
1,k
sub(f) =
∑
s∈S
∑
a1∈A1(s)
d
1,k
sub(s, a
1)f(s, a1)
for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n1 and f ∈ FS . These costs are called as subscription
type because they are based only on the fraction of time during which a given
action is used at a given state and are not based on how frequently the state
is visited and action is used. This situation can arise where for using some
services there is subscription/registration fee for their planned use and that
can be paid in advance.
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Subscription type constraints
The subscription type constraints of player 1 are defined as
D
1,k
sub(f) ≤ ξ
1
k, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1. (5)
We denote Ci, i = 1, 2 and D2,l, l = 1, 2, · · · , n2, as expected costs which
can be either average or discounted that depends on the criterion being used.
Under average cost criterion both players have expected average costs and
under discounted cost criterion both players have expected discounted costs.
Apart from this, player 1 has subscription based costs which are constrained
by some given reals. It is clear that player 1 has n1 number of constraints
which are defined by (5) and player 2 has n2 number of constraints which are
defined as
D2,l(γ, fh, gh) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2. (6)
The constraints (5) and (6) are called subscription based and realization based
constraints respectively. Both the players choose their actions independently
and want to minimize their expected cost subject to their constraints from (5)
and (6). We denote this constrained stochastic game by Gc. As Nash equilib-
rium exists in stationary strategies under assumptions (A1)-(A2) given below
[3], from now onwards we restrict ourselves to the stationary strategies.
The strategy pair (f, g) is called 1-feasible if it satisfies (5) and strategy pair
(f, g) is called 2-feasible if it satisfies (6). As the player 1 constraints (5) do not
depend on the strategies of player 2, then strategy pair (f, g) is 1-feasible for all
g ∈ GS if f satisfies (5). A strategy pair (f, g) is called feasible if it is both 1-
feasible and 2-feasible. Let F ξS denote the set of all feasible stationary strategy
pairs for the constrained stochastic game Gc. We shall assume throughout that
F
ξ
S is non-empty. Now, we recall the definition of Nash equilibrium as given in
[3]. A strategy pair (f∗, g∗) ∈ F ξS is called the Nash equilibrium of constrained
stochastic game Gc if it satisfies the following conditions
C1(γ, f∗, g∗) ≤ C1(γ, f, g∗), ∀ 1-feasible (f, g∗) (7)
C2(γ, f∗, g∗) ≤ C2(γ, f∗, gh), ∀ 2-feasible (f∗, gh). (8)
Thus, unilateral deviation of any player i, i = 1, 2, will either violate the con-
straints of ith player, or if it does not, it will result in a cost Ci for that player
that is not lower than the one achieved by feasible strategy pair (f∗, g∗). The
strategy pair (f∗, g∗) ∈ F ξS satisfying (7) and (8) would still be Nash equilib-
rium of constrained stochastic game if we replace strategy gh by stationary
strategy g in (8). This can be seen by noticing that when strategy of player 1
is fixed as a stationary strategy f∗, then player 2 is faced with a constrained
Markov decision process (CMDP) where optimal strategy always exists in the
space of stationary strategies [20].
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Assumptions [Altman and Shwartz [3]]
(A1) Ergodicity: In case of average cost criterion the unichain ergodic structure
holds, i.e., under every stationary strategy g the state process is an irre-
ducible Markov chain with one ergodic class (and possibly some transient
states).
(A2) Strong Slater condition: For player 2, there exists some g′ such that for
any strategy f of player 1,
D2,l(γ, f, g′) < ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2 · · · , n2.
As the constraints of player 1 are linear and does not depend on the strategies
of player 2, the strong Slater condition is not needed for the constraints of
player 1.
We use the following notations throughout this section. For i = 1, 2, s ∈ S,
l = 1, 2, · · · , n2,
• Ci(s) =
[
ci(s, a1, a2)
]|A1(s)|,|A2(s)|
a1=1,a2=1
.
• Ci = diag
(
C
i(1),Ci(2), · · · ,Ci(|S|)
)
.
• D2,l(s) =
[
d2,l(s, a1, a2)
]|A1(s)|,|A2(s)|
a1=1,a2=1
.
• x =
(
x (1)
T
, x (2)
T
, · · · , x (|S|)
T
)T
.
• x(s) =
(
x(s, 1), x(s, 2), · · · , x
(
s, |A2(s)|
))T
.
• u = (u(1), u(2), · · · , u(|S|))
T
.
• v ∈ R.
• z = (z(1), z(2), · · · , z(|S|))
T
.
• δ1 = (δ11 , δ
1
2 , · · · , δ
1
n1
)T .
• δ2 = (δ21 , δ
2
2 , · · · , δ
2
n2
)T .
• 1n = (1, 1, · · · , 1)
T ∈ Rn.
2.1 Single controller constrained stochastic game with average cost criterion
In this section we consider the game described in Section 2 with average cost
criterion where both players choose their strategies independently and mini-
mize their expected average costs as defined in (1) subject to their constraints
from (5), (2). The constraints of player 1 given in (5) are subscription based.
The expected average constraints (2) of player 2 captures the fact that the
average consumption of resource l, l = 1, 2, · · · , n2, by player 2 is not more
than given ξ2l .
2.1.1 Average occupation measure
For an initial distribution γ and a stationary strategy g define the average
occupation measure
pi2ea(γ, g) :=
{
pi2ea(γ, g; s, a
2) : s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
}
.
Constrained stochastic games 11
For all s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s), pi2ea(γ, g; s, a
2) is given by
pi2ea(γ, g; s, a
2) = pig(s)g(s, a2) (9)
where pig = (pig(1), pig(2), · · · , pig(|S|)) is steady state distribution of Markov
chain induced by stationary strategy g which exists and is unique under (A1).
pi2ea(γ, g) can be considered as a probability measure over K
2 that assigns prob-
ability pi2ea(γ, g; s, a
2) to the state-action pair (s, a2). The occupation measure
defined as in (9) is independent from initial distribution γ, so, we drop γ from
the notation. For fixed strategy pair (f, g) ∈ FS × GS the expected average
costs of both the players can be written in terms of occupation measure as
Ciea(f, g) =
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
pi2ea(g; s, a
2)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1)ci(s, a1, a2), ∀ i = 1, 2.
D2,lea (f, g) =
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
pi2ea(g; s, a
2)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1)d2,l(s, a1, a2)
for all l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
Let Qea be the set of vectors x ∈ R
|K2| satisfying

(i)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
(
δ(s, s′)− p(s′|s, a2)
)
x(s, a2) = 0, ∀ s′ ∈ S
(ii)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
x(s, a2) = 1
(iii) x(s, a2) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s).
δ(·, ·) is a Kronecker delta, i.e.,
δ(s, s′) =
{
1 if s = s′,
0 if s 6= s′.
The stationary strategies are complete, i.e., set of occupation measures achieved
by history dependent strategies equals to those achieved by stationary strate-
gies and further equals to the setQea [20]. It is known that for each (s, a
2) ∈ K2,
x(s, a2) = pi2ea(g; s, a
2) where
g(s, a2) =
x(s, a2)∑
a2∈A2(s) x(s, a
2)
(10)
whenever denominator is nonzero (when it is zero g(s) is chosen arbitrarily
from ℘(A2(s))) [20].
The cost of player 1 when he uses action a1 at state s and player 2 uses
strategy g is given by
c1(s, a1; g) =
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
c1(s, a1, a2)pi2ea(g; s, a
2).
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Similarly, the costs of player 2 when he uses action a2 at state s and player 1
uses strategy f are given by
c2(f ; s, a2) =
∑
a1∈A1(s)
c2(s, a1, a2)f(s, a1).
d2,l(f ; s, a2) =
∑
a1∈A1(s)
d2,l(s, a1, a2)f(s, a1), ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
2.1.2 Mathematical programming formulation
We show the one to one correspondence between the stationary Nash equilibria
of single controller constrained stochastic game Gc with average cost criterion
and the global minima of a certain mathematical program.
Best response linear programs
For a given stationary strategy of one player in a two player constrained
stochastic game, the best response of the other player is given by solving a
constrained Markov decision model, which, in turn, can be obtained by a linear
program in finite state-action setting [20]. For fixed strategy g of player 2, the
best response of player 1 can be obtained from the following linear program:
min
f
∑
(s,a1)∈K1
c1(s, a1; g)f(s, a1)
s.t.
(i)
∑
(s,a1)∈K1
d
1,k
sub(s, a
1)f(s, a1) ≤ ξ1k, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(ii)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1) = 1, ∀ s ∈ S
(iii) f(s, a1) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s).


(11)
The dual of (11) is
max
z, δ1
[∑
s∈S
z(s)−
n1∑
k=1
δ1kξ
1
k
]
s.t.
(i) z(s) ≤ c1(s, a1; g) +
n1∑
k=1
δ1kd
1,k
sub(s, a
1), ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(ii) δ1k ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1.


(12)
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Similarly, for fixed strategy f of player 1, the best response of player 2 can be
obtained from the following linear program:
min
x
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
c2(f ; s, a2)x(s, a2)
s.t.
(i)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
(
δ(s, s′)− p(s′|s, a2)
)
x(s, a2) = 0, ∀ s′ ∈ S
(ii)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
x(s, a2) = 1
(iii)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
d2,l(f ; s, a2)x(s, a2) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2
(iv) x(s, a2) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s).


(13)
If x∗ is the optimal solution of the linear program (13), then the best response
strategy g∗ of player 2 can be obtained from (10) [20]. The dual of the linear
program (13) is given by
max
v,u δ2
[
v −
n2∑
l=1
δ2l ξ
2
l
]
s.t.
(i) v + u(s) ≤ c2(f ; s, a2) +
n2∑
l=1
δ2l d
2,l(f ; s, a2)
+
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a2)u(s′), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(ii) δ2l ≥ 0, ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.


(14)
We denote the decision variables and objective function of mathematical
program [MP1] by η = (v, uT , zT , fT , xT , (δ1)T , (δ2)T )T and Φ(η) respectively.
Theorem 1 (a) If (f∗, g∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the constrained stochas-
tic game Gc with average cost criterion, then, there exists a vector η∗ =(
v∗, u∗T , z∗T , f∗T , x∗T , (δ1∗)T , (δ2∗)T
)T
such that it is a global minimum
of mathematical program [MP1] given below
[MP1] min
η
[(
fTC1x−
(
1
T
|S|z − (δ
1)T ξ1
))
+
(
fTC2x−
(
v − (δ2)T ξ2
))]
s.t.
(i) v + u(s) ≤
[
(f(s))
T
C
2(s)
]
a2
+
n2∑
l=1
δ2l
[
(f(s))
T
D
2,l(s)
]
a2
+
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a2)u(s′), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
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(ii) z(s) ≤
[
C
1(s)x(s)
]
a1
+
n1∑
k=1
δ1kd
1,k
sub(s, a
1), ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(iii)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
[
δ(s, s′)− p(s′|s, a2)
]
x(s, a2) = 0, ∀ s′ ∈ S
(iv)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
x(s, a2) = 1
(v)
∑
(s,a1)∈K1
d
1,k
sub(s, a
1)f(s, a1) ≤ ξ1k, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(vi)
∑
s∈S
(f(s))TD2,l(s)x(s) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2
(vii)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1) = 1, ∀ s ∈ S
(viii) f(s, a1) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(ix) x(s, a2) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(x) δ1k ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(xi) δ2l ≥ 0, ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
with Φ(η∗) = 0.
(b) If η∗ =
(
v∗, u∗T , z∗T , f∗T , x∗T , (δ1∗)T , (δ2∗)T
)T
is a global minimum of
[MP1] with Φ(η∗) = 0, then, (f∗, g∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the con-
strained stochastic game Gc with average cost criterion, where
g∗(s, a2) =
x∗(s, a2)∑
a2∈A2(s) x
∗(s, a2)
for all s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s) whenever the denominator is non-zero (when it
is zero g∗(s) is chosen arbitrarily from ℘(A2(s))).
Proof (a) Let (f∗, g∗) be Nash equilibrium of the constrained stochastic game
Gc with average cost criterion. We construct occupation measure x∗ corre-
sponding to g∗ as given in (9) then x∗ satisfies (iii), (iv) and (ix) of [MP1]. The
strategy pair (f∗, g∗) is feasible because it is a Nash equilibrium, so, (f∗, x∗)
satisfy (v)-(viii) of [MP1]. As f∗ and g∗ are best responses of each other, x∗ as
constructed above will be optimal solution of linear program (13) for fixed f∗
from Proposition 3.1(ii) of [3]. By strong duality theorem [24], [25] there exists
optimal solution (v∗, u∗, δ2∗) of (14) such that (v∗, u∗, f∗, δ2∗) satisfy (i) and
(xi) of [MP1] and objective function value of (13) and (14) are equal. Similarly,
f∗ is an optimal solution of linear program (11) for fixed g∗ and hence there
exists optimal solution (z∗, δ1∗) of (12) such that (z∗, x∗, δ1∗) satisfy (ii) and
(x) of [MP1] and objective function value of (11) and (12) are equal. In other
words we have a point η∗ =
(
v∗, u∗T , z∗T , f∗T , x∗T , (δ1∗)T , (δ2∗)T
)T
such that
(i), (ii), (x) and (xi) are satisfied and
f∗TC1x∗ = 1T|S|z
∗ − (δ1∗)T ξ1,
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f∗TC2x∗ = v∗ − (δ2∗)T ξ2.
Thus, η∗ is a feasible point of the mathematical program [MP1] and from the
construction of the objective function, Φ(η∗) = 0.
Let η be any feasible point of [MP1]. Multiply each constraint in (ii) of
[MP1] corresponding to pair (s, a1) by f(s, a1) and then add over all (s, a1) ∈ K1
and by using the constraints (v), (vii), (viii) and (x) we have
fTC1x ≥ 1T|S|z − (δ
1)T ξ1. (15)
By using the similar arguments as above, i.e., multiply each constraint in (i)
of [MP1] corresponding to pair (s, a2) by x(s, a2) and add over all (s, a2) ∈ K2
and by using the constraints (iii), (iv), (vi), (ix) and (xi), we have
fTC2x ≥ v − (δ2)T ξ2. (16)
We have from (15) and (16), Φ(η) ≥ 0 for all feasible points η of [MP1]. Thus
η∗ is a global minimum of the [MP1].
(b) Let η∗ be a global minimum of [MP1] such that Φ(η∗) = 0. As η∗ is
a feasible point of [MP1] then (15) and (16) will also hold for η∗, i.e.,
f∗TC1x∗ ≥ 1T|S|z
∗ − (δ1∗)T ξ1
f∗TC2x∗ ≥ v∗ − (δ2∗)T ξ2.
From above, both the terms of objective function are non-negative at η∗ but
the objective function value is zero at η∗ which means both the terms are
individually zero, i.e.,
f∗TC1x∗ = 1T|S|z
∗ − (δ1∗)T ξ1
f∗TC2x∗ = v∗ − (δ2∗)T ξ2.
}
(17)
Fix η∗, and from the same argument used as in (15) and by using the con-
straints (v), (vii), (viii), (x) and (17) we have the following inequality
f∗TC1x∗ ≤ fTC1x∗, ∀ 1-feasible (f, x∗),
Similarly we have
f∗TC2x∗ ≤ f∗TC2x, ∀ 2-feasible (f∗, x)
In other words we can say that
C1ea(f
∗, g∗) ≤ C1ea(f, g
∗), ∀ 1-feasible(f, g∗)
C2ea(f
∗, g∗) ≤ C2ea(f
∗, g), ∀ 2-feasible(f∗, g),
where
g∗(s, a2) =
x∗(s, a2)∑
a2∈A2(s) x
∗(s, a2)
for all s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s) whenever the denominator is non-zero (when it is
zero g∗(s) is chosen arbitrarily from ℘(A2(s))). This implies that (f∗, g∗) is
a Nash equilibrium of the constrained stochastic game Gc with average cost
criterion.
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Remark 1 Because the diagonal elements of the objective function’s Hessian
matrix are zero, it will have some positive as well as some negative eigenvalues.
So, the objective function of [MP1] is a non-convex function. As there are some
non-convex constraints, the feasible region is also not a convex set. So, [MP1]
is a non-convex constrained optimization problem.
2.1.3 Special cases
We consider two special cases. First, we consider nonzero sum game as defined
in Section 2 with average cost criterion where the constraints of player 2 do
not depend on the strategies of player 1. Next, we briefly consider the zero
sum game as considered in [6].
(i) Quadratic program in the case of decoupled constraints
We consider the situation where the constraints of player 2 do not depend on
the strategies of the player 1. This is possible when the immediate costs of
player 2 which correspond to the constraints of player 2 do not depend on the
actions of player 1, i.e.,
d2,l(s, a1, a2) = d2,l(s, a2), ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s), a2 ∈ A2(s) and ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
(18)
Under this condition [MP1] reduces to the quadratic program [QP1] given
below:
[QP1] min
η
[(
fTC1x−
(
1T|S|z − (δ
1)T ξ1
))
+
(
fTC2x−
(
v − (δ2)T ξ2
))]
s.t.
(i) v + u(s) ≤
[
(f(s))TC2(s)
]
a2
+
n2∑
l=1
δ2l d
2,l(s, a2)
+
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a2)u(s′), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(ii) z(s) ≤
[
C
1(s)x(s)
]
a1
+
n1∑
k=1
δ1kd
1,k
sub(s, a
1), ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(iii)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
[
δ(s, s′)− p(s′|s, a2)
]
x(s, a2) = 0, ∀ s′ ∈ S
(iv)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
x(s, a2) = 1
(v)
∑
(s,a1)∈K1
d
1,k
sub(s, a
1)f(s, a1) ≤ ξ1k, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(vi)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
d2,l(s, a2)x(s, a2) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2
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(vii)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1) = 1, ∀ s ∈ S
(viii) f(s, a1) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(ix) x(s, a2) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(x) δ1k ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(xi) δ2l ≥ 0, ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
(ii) Zero sum single controller constrained stochastic games
The zero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with average cost
criterion is considered in [6]. We assume that player 1 minimizes the expected
average cost of the game and player 2 has opposite objective, i.e., he maxi-
mizes the expected average cost of the game. In [6], the player who controls
the transition probabilities has realization based constraints and other player
has no constraints and these games can be solved by a linear program. By
substituting C1(s) = −C2(s) = C(s) for all s ∈ S and without the sub-
scription type constraints, the quadratic program [QP1] can be reduced into
primal-dual pair of linear programs which are same as given in [6].
2.2 Single controller constrained stochastic game with discounted cost
criterion
In this section we consider the game described in Section 2 with discounted
cost criterion where both players choose their strategies independently and
minimize their expected discounted costs as defined in (3) subject to their
constraints from (5), (4). The constraints of player 1 given in (5) are subscrip-
tion based. The expected discounted constraints (4) of player 2 captures the
fact that discounted cost for the consumption of resource l, l = 1, 2, · · · , n2,
by player 2 is not more than given ξ2l . Similar to the average cost criterion we
give one mathematical program which characterizes stationary Nash equilibria
of these games.
2.2.1 Discounted occupation measure
For an initial distribution γ and a stationary strategy g define the discounted
occupation measure
pi2β(γ, g) :=
{
pi2β(γ, g; s, a
2) : s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
}
.
For all s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s), pi2β(γ, g; s, a
2) is given by
pi2β(γ, g; s, a
2) = (1− β)
(
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
s′∈S
γ(s′)
(
[P (g)]t
)
s′s
)
g(s, a2), (19)
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here [P (g)]0 is the identity matrix. pi2β(γ, g) can be considered as a probability
measure over K2 that assigns probability pi2β(γ, g; s, a
2) to the state-action pair
(s, a2). For fixed strategy pair (f, g) ∈ FS ×GS the expected discounted costs
of both players can be written in terms of occupation measure as
Ciβ(γ, f, g) =
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
pi2β(γ, g; s, a
2)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1)ci(s, a1, a2), ∀ i = 1, 2.
D
2,l
β (γ, f, g) =
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
pi2β(γ, g; s, a
2)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1)d2,l(s, a1, a2)
for all l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
Let Qβ(γ) be the set of vectors x ∈ R|K
2| satisfying

(i)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
(
δ(s, s′)− βp(s′|s, a2)
)
x(s, a2) = (1− β)γ(s′), ∀ s′ ∈ S
(ii) x(s, a2) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s).
By summing the first constraint over s′ we note that
∑
(s,a2)∈K2 x(s, a
2) = 1, so
the x satisfying the above constraints are probability measures. The stationary
strategies are complete, i.e., set of occupation measures achieved by history
dependent strategies equals to those achieved by stationary strategies and
further equals to the set Qβ(γ) [20]. It is known that for each (s, a2) ∈ K2,
x(s, a2) = pi2β(γ, g; s, a
2) where
g(s, a2) =
x(s, a2)∑
a2∈A2(s) x(s, a
2)
(20)
whenever denominator is nonzero (when it is zero g(s) is chosen arbitrarily
from ℘(A2(s))) [20].
The cost of player 1 when he uses action a1 at state s and player 2 uses
strategy g is given by
c1(s, a1; g) =
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
c1(s, a1, a2)pi2β(γ, g; s, a
2).
Similarly, the costs of player 2 when he uses action a2 at state s and player 1
uses strategy f are given by
c2(f ; s, a2) =
∑
a1∈A1(s)
c2(s, a1, a2)f(s, a1).
d2,l(f ; s, a2) =
∑
a1∈A1(s)
d2,l(s, a1, a2)f(s, a1), ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
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2.2.2 Mathematical programming formulation
Similar to average cost criterion we show the one to one correspondence be-
tween the stationary Nash equilibria of this class of game and the global min-
ima of a certain mathematical program.
Best response linear programs
For fixed strategy g of player 2, the best response of player 1 can be obtained
from the following linear program:
min
f
∑
(s,a1)∈K1
c1(s, a1; g)f(s, a1)
s.t.
(i)
∑
(s,a1)∈K1
d
1,k
sub(s, a
1)f(s, a1) ≤ ξ1k, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(ii)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1) = 1, ∀ s ∈ S
(iii) f(s, a1) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s).


(21)
The dual of (21) is
max
z, δ1
[∑
s∈S
z(s)−
n1∑
k=1
δ1kξ
1
k
]
s.t.
(i) z(s) ≤ c1(s, a1; g) +
n1∑
k=1
δ1kd
1,k
sub(s, a
1), ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(ii) δ1k ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1.


(22)
Similarly for fixed strategy f of player 1, the best response of player 2 can be
obtained from the following linear program:
min
x
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
c2(f ; s, a2)x(s, a2)
s.t.
(i)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
(
δ(s, s′)− βp(s′|s, a2)
)
x(s, a2) = (1 − β)γ(s′), ∀ s′ ∈ S
(ii)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
d2,l(f ; s, a2)x(s, a2) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2
(iii) x(s, a2) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s).


(23)
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If x∗ is the optimal solution of the linear program (23) then the best response
strategy g∗ of player 2 can be obtained from (20) [20]. The dual of the linear
program (23) is given by
max
u δ2
[∑
s∈S
(1− β)γ(s)u(s)−
n2∑
l=1
δ2l ξ
2
l
]
s.t.
(i) u(s) ≤ c2(f ; s, a2) +
n2∑
l=1
δ2l d
2,l(f ; s, a2)
+ β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a2)u(s′), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(ii) δ2l ≥ 0, ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.


(24)
By using the best response linear programs (21), (22), (23),(24) we have similar
results as in the case of average cost criterion.
Theorem 2 (a) If (f∗, g∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the constrained stochastic
game Gc with discounted cost criterion, then, there exists a vector η∗ =(
u∗T , z∗T , f∗T , x∗T , (δ1∗)T , (δ2∗)T
)T
such that it is a global minimum of
mathematical program [MP2] given below
[MP2] min
η
[ (
fTC1x−
(
1
T
|S|z − (δ
1)T ξ1
))
+
(
fTC2x−
(
(1 − β)γTu− (δ2)T ξ2
)) ]
s.t.
(i) u(s) ≤
[
(f(s))TC2(s)
]
a2
+
n2∑
l=1
δ2l
[
(f(s))TD2,l(s)
]
a2
+ β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a2)u(s′), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(ii) z(s) ≤
[
C
1(s)x(s)
]
a1
+
n1∑
k=1
δ1kd
1,k
sub(s, a
1), ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(iii)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
[
δ(s, s′)− βp(s′|s, a2)
]
x(s, a2) = (1− β)γ(s′), ∀ s′ ∈ S
(iv)
∑
(s,a1)∈K1
d
1,k
sub(s, a
1)f(s, a1) ≤ ξ1k, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(v)
∑
s∈S
(f(s))TD2,l(s)x(s) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2
(vi)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1) = 1, ∀ s ∈ S
(vii) f(s, a1) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
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(viii) x(s, a2) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(ix) δ1k ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(x) δ2l ≥ 0, ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
with Φ(η∗) = 0.
(b) If η∗ =
(
u∗T , z∗T , f∗T , x∗T , (δ1∗)T , (δ2∗)T
)T
is a global minimum of [MP2]
with Φ(η∗) = 0, then, (f∗, g∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the constrained
stochastic game Gc with discounted cost criterion, where
g∗(s, a2) =
x∗(s, a2)∑
a2∈A2(s) x
∗(s, a2)
for all s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s) whenever the denominator is non-zero (when it
is zero g∗(s) is chosen arbitrarily from ℘(A2(s))).
Proof We can prove this by using the best response linear programs (21), (22),
(23),(24) and with similar argument given in the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 2 Similar to [MP1], [MP2] is also a non-convex constrained optimiza-
tion problem.
Remark 3 Both [MP1] and [MP2] can be obtained from single mathematical
program [MP4] given in Appendix (A).
2.2.3 Special cases
We consider two special cases. First, we consider nonzero sum game as defined
in Section 2 with discounted cost criterion where the constraints of player 2
do not depend on the strategies of the player 1. Next, we briefly consider the
zero sum game as considered in [1].
(i) Quadratic program in case of decoupled constraints
When the constraints of player 2 do not depend on the strategies of player
1, i.e., under condition (18) the mathematical program [MP2] reduces to a
quadratic program [QP2] given below
[QP2] min
η
[ (
fTC1x−
(
1T|S|z − (δ
1)T ξ1
))
+
(
fTC2x−
(
(1 − β)γTu− (δ2)T ξ2
)) ]
s.t.
(i) u(s) ≤
[
(f(s))TC2(s)
]
a2
+
n2∑
l=1
δ2l d
2,l(s, a2)
+ β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a2)u(s′), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
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(ii) z(s) ≤
[
C
1(s)x(s)
]
a1
+
n1∑
k=1
δ1kd
1,k
sub(s, a
1), ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(iii)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
[
δ(s, s′)− βp(s′|s, a2)
]
x(s, a2) = (1− β)γ(s′), ∀ s′ ∈ S
(iv)
∑
(s,a1)∈K1
d
1,k
sub(s, a
1)f(s, a1) ≤ ξ1k, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(v)
∑
(s,a2)∈K2
d2,l(s, a2)x(s, a2) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2
(vi)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1) = 1, ∀ s ∈ S
(vii) f(s, a1) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(viii) x(s, a2) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(ix) δ1k ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(x) δ2l ≥ 0, ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
(ii) Zero sum single controller constrained stochastic games
The zero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with discounted
cost criterion is considered in [1]. In [1], the first player has subscription based
constraints and second player has realization based constraints which do not
depend on the strategies of first player and these games can be solved by a
linear program. Setting C1(s) = −C2(s) = C(s) for all s ∈ S the quadratic
program [QP2] can be separated into primal-dual pair of linear programs which
are same as given in [1].
2.3 A Numerical Example
We give one numerical example where immediate costs of player 2 correspond-
ing to his constraints do not depend on the actions of player 1. We compute the
Nash equilibrium of this game by solving corresponding quadratic program.
The components of the stochastic game are
1. The state space S = {1, 2}.
2. The action sets of both the players are Ai(s) = {1, 2}, i = 1, 2, s = 1, 2.
3. The immediate costs of both the players that defines their expected cost
which they want to minimize and transition probabilities of the game are
given in the Table 1(a) and 1(b).
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Table 1 Immediate costs and transition probabilities
(a) s = 1
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
(5,4)
( 1
2
, 1
2
)
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
(6,3)
( 1
3
, 2
3
)
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
(7,3)
( 1
2
, 1
2
)
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
(4,6)
( 1
3
, 2
3
)
(b) s = 2
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳❳
(2,3)
(1, 0)
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
(4,2)
( 1
5
, 4
5
)
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳❳
(3,1)
(1,0)
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
(3,4)
( 1
5
, 4
5
)
In both the tables above, the entry in upper triangle in each box gives the
transition probabilities and the entry in lower triangle gives the immediate
cost of both the players corresponding to the actions chosen by both the
players in that state. For example, at state 1 when both the player choose
action 1, then, player 1 gets immediate cost 5 and player 2 gets 4 and
this is represented by entry (5, 4) and game will remain in state 1 with
probability 12 and it can move to state 2 with probability
1
2 and this is
represented by entry (12 ,
1
2 ) in the table corresponding to state 1. It is easy
to check that transition probabilities given in tables above satisfies the
ergodicity assumption (A1).
4. Both the players have one constraint, i.e., player 1 has one subscription
based constraint and player 2 has one realization based constraint. The
subscription cost of player 1 and immediate cost of player 2 corresponding
to each state-action pair are given in Table 2(a) and 2(b) respectively.
Table 2 Costs defining constraints
(a) d1
sub
(s, a1)
s = 1 s = 2
a1 = 1 2 3
a1 = 2 3 1
(b) d2(s, a2)
s = 1 s = 2
a2 = 1 1 4
a2 = 2 2 5
5. The bound defining constraints are ξ1 = 4, ξ2 = 2.5.
From Table 1(a) and 1(b) it is clear that the game is controlled by player 2.
(i) For average cost criterion we solve the quadratic program [QP1] corre-
sponding to the above data, by using MATLAB and obtain
η∗ = (3.0278, 4.1667, 2.833, 3.8667, 1.3067, 0.6944, 0.3056, 0.3472, 0.6528,
0.2667, 0.36, 0.3733, 0, 0.1867, 0).
Note that at η∗ the objective function value is zero and hence it is the global
minimum of quadratic program.We have x∗(1, 1) = 0.2667, x∗(1, 2) = 0.36,
x∗(2, 1) = 0.3733, x∗(2, 2) = 0. From (10) we have g∗(1, 1) = 0.4256,
g∗(1, 2) = 0.5744, g∗(2, 1) = 1, g∗(2, 2) = 0. From Theorem 1(b) the Nash
equilibrium of constrained stochastic game defined above with average cost
criterion is
f∗ = ((0.6944, 0.3056), (0.3472, 0.6528)) , g∗ = ((0.4256, 0.5744), (1, 0))
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and the average costs of both the players at Nash equilibrium (f∗, g∗) are
C1ea(f
∗, g∗) = 4.4268
C2ea(f
∗, g∗) = 3.0279.
(ii) For discounted cost criterion we take β = 0.5, γ = (0.5, 0.5). We solve
the quadratic program [QP2] corresponding to the above data, by using
MATLAB and obtain
η∗ = (10.2222, 10.8888, 3.5833, 1.4583, 1, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0.3333, 0.25, 0.4167, 0,
0.2083, 0.9444).
Note that at η∗ the objective function is zero and hence it is the global
minimum of quadratic program.We have x∗(1, 1) = 0.3333, x∗(1, 2) = 0.25,
x∗(2, 1) = 0.4167, x∗(2, 2) = 0. From (20) we have g∗(1, 1) = 0.5714,
g∗(1, 2) = 0.4286, g∗(2, 1) = 1, g∗(2, 2) = 0. From Theorem 2(b) the Nash
equilibrium of constrained stochastic game defined above with discounted
cost criterion is
f∗ = ((1, 0), (0.5, 0.5)) , g∗ = ((0.5714, 0.4286), (1, 0))
and the discounted costs of both the players at Nash equilibrium (f∗, g∗)
are
C1β(γ, f
∗, g∗) = 4.2082
C2β(γ, f
∗, g∗) = 2.9166.
3 Constrained stochastic game with independent state processes
In this section we consider a N -player constrained stochastic game with inde-
pendent state processes as discussed in [2]. In these games each player controls
his own Markov chain, whose transition probabilities do not depend on the
states and actions of other players. In these games at any time, each player
has information only about current and past states of his Markov chain as
well as of his previous actions and does not have any information about the
states and actions of other players. However, each player wants to minimize
his expected average cost that depends on the strategies of all the players. The
expected average constraints of each player also depend on the strategies of
all the players. These games come under the class of decentralized stochastic
games.
The game is described by the tuple
(
Si, γi, Ai, ci, di, pi, ξi
)
, i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
where:
(i) Si is the finite state space of player i, i = 1, · · · , N . The generic ele-
ment of Si is denoted by si. Define, S:=×Nj=1S
j and S−i:=×j 6=iS
j (×
stands for the product space). The element of S is denoted by s where
s = (s1, s2, · · · , sN ) and s−i ∈ S−i denote the vector of states sj, j 6= i.
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(ii) γi is the probability distribution for the initial state of player i, i =
1, · · · , N . We assume that the initial states of all the players are inde-
pendent. Denote γ = (γ1, γ2, · · · , γN ).
(iii) Ai is the finite action (strategy) set of player i and its element is denoted
by ai, i = 1, · · · , N . Ai(si) denotes the set of all actions of player i at
state si and Ai =
⋃
si∈Si A
i(si). We denote a = (a1, a2, · · · , aN) and a−i
as vector of actions aj , j 6= i.
(iv) Define, Ki = {(si, ai)|si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si)}, i = 1, 2, · · · , N and K=×Ni=1K
i,
K−i=×j 6=iK
j .
(v) ci : K → R is immediate cost of player i, i = 1, · · · , N . Specifically, ci(s, a)
is the immediate cost incurred by player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , when state of
players is (s1, s2, · · · , sN ) and actions chosen by them are (a1, a2, · · · , aN )
respectively. Each player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , wants to minimize the expected
average cost involving ci(·, ·).
(vi) di =
(
di,1, di,2, · · · , di,ni
)
, where di,k : K → R for all k = 1, 2, · · · , ni are
immediate costs of player i, i = 1, · · · , N . These di,k(·, ·) are involved in
the kth constraint, k = 1, 2, · · · , ni, on expected average cost of player i,
i = 1, · · · , N .
(vii) pi : Ki → ℘(Si) is the transition probability of player i, i = 1, · · · , N ,
where pi(s¯i|si, ai) is the probability that the state of player i moves from
state si to s¯i if he chooses action ai ∈ Ai(si).
(viii) ξi =
(
ξi1, ξ
i
2, · · · , ξ
i
ni
)
are the bounds defining the constraints of player i,
i = 1, · · · , N .
The game dynamics are as follows. Initially, at time t = 0 state of the
game is s = (s1, s2, · · · , sN ) where si ∈ Si is chosen according to independent
random variables γi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Players independently choose actions
a = (a1, a2, · · · , aN ) with ai ∈ Ai(si), i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Player i obtains an
immediate cost ci(s, a), i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Apart from this cost, player i, i =
1, 2, · · · , N , also receives another ni costs {d
i,k(s, a)}, k = 1, 2, · · · , ni. These
{di,k(·, ·)}, k = 1, 2, · · · , ni, are involved in the expected average cost function-
als of player i which are constrained by specified bounds {ξik}, k = 1, · · · , ni.
Now, the state of player i switches to a new state s¯i at time t = 1 with prob-
ability pi(s¯i|si, ai), i = 1, · · · , N . At time t = 1, in state s¯i, player i then
independently chooses an action a¯i, receives costs ci(s¯, a¯) and {di,k(s¯, a¯)},
k = 1, · · · , ni and i = 1, · · · , N . The next state for this player is s˜
i with prob-
ability pi(s˜i|s¯i, a¯i). The dynamics of the Markov chains repeat at new state
s˜ = (s˜1, · · · , s˜N ) and game continues for infinite time horizon.
While transition probabilities depend only on the present state and action
used, actions that are used can depend on ‘past’, as in history dependent
strategies. Define a history of player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , at time t as hit =
(si0, a
i
0, s
i
1, a
i
1, · · · , s
i
t−1, a
i
t−1, s
i
t) where s
i
t ∈ S
i, ait ∈ A
i(sit), i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . LetHit denote the set of all possible histories of length t of player
i. Each player observes his own history and does not have any information
about the other player’s history. A decision rule f it : H
i
t → ℘(A
i(sit)) of player
i at time t is a function which assigns to each history of length t of player i, a
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probability measure over action set of player i. This means that under decision
rule f it player i chooses action a
i with probability f it (h
i
t, a
i). The sequence of
decision rules is called the strategy of the player. Let f ih = (f i0, f
i
1, · · · , f
i
t , · · · )
denote the strategy of player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , and is called history dependent
(behavioral) strategy. Note that the strategies of players do not depend on the
realizations of the costs. If strategies were allowed to depend on such costs,
then a player could use the costs to estimate the state and actions of the other
players.
Let F i denote the set of all history dependent strategies of player i and
F =×Ni=1F
i be the class of history dependent multi-strategies. These strategies
are called Markovian if at every decision epoch the decision rule depends only
on the current state but the decision rule can differ at every epoch. A stationary
strategy is a Markovian strategy which is independent of the time, i.e., at every
decision epoch the decision rule is same. So, for stationary strategy f it = f
i
for all t, i.e., (f i, f i, f i, · · · ) is a stationary strategy of player i. We denote,
with some abuse of notations, f i as the stationary strategy of player i. Let FSi
denote the set of all stationary strategies of player i and FS=×
N
i=1FSi denote
the class of stationary multi-strategies. For, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , stationary strat-
egy f i ∈ FSi is identified with f
i =
(
(f i(1))T , (f i(2))T , · · · , (f i(|Si|))T
)T
,
where f i(si) =
(
f i(si, 1), f i(si, 2), · · · , f i
(
si, |Ai(si)|
))T
for all si ∈ Si. For
all si ∈ Si, f i(si, ai) is then, the probability of choosing action ai ∈ Ai(si) by
player i, i = 1, · · · , N . For fh ∈ F we denote f−ih as the vector of strategies
f jh, j 6= i, and for any gih ∈ F i we define (f−ih, gih) to be the multi-strategy,
where, for j 6= i, player j uses f jh and player i uses gih. Under mild assump-
tions, which we also make, Altman, et al [2] show that a Nash equilibrium
exists for the above constrained stochastic game within the class of stationary
strategies.
This leads to the introduction of vector stochastic process {Xt,At}
∞
t=0,
whereXt =
(
X1t , X
2
t , · · · , X
N
t
)
, At =
(
A
1
t ,A
2
t , · · · ,A
N
t
)
,X it denote the state of
the player i and Ait denote the action chosen by player i at time t, t = 0, 1, · · · .
An initial distribution γ together with multi-strategy fh ∈ F defines a unique
probability measure Pγ
fh
on an appropriate probability space with respect to
which the laws of vector stochastic process {Xt,At}
∞
t=0 of states and actions
can be defined. The expectation operator on this probability space is denoted
by Eγ
fh
.
The expected average costs
These costs are average functionals of states and actions of all the players
and each player minimizes his cost functionals. For given initial distribution γ
and multi-strategy fh the expected average cost of player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N is
defined as
Ciea(γ, f
h) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
γ
fh
ci(Xt,At). (25)
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The expected average constraints
The constraints of each player are defined by average functionals of states and
actions of all the players which are bounded by given reals. For given initial
distribution γ and multi-strategy fh the expected average costs of player i,
i = 1, 2, · · ·N are defined as
Di,kea (γ, f
h) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
γ
fh
di,k(Xt,At), ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni.
Di,kea (·, ·) can capture the average consumption of resource k, k = 1, 2, · · · , ni,
by player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N . The constraints of player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N are
given as
Di,kea (γ, f
h) ≤ ξik, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni. (26)
The constraints (26) captures the fact that average consumption of resource k
by player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , when player i uses strategy f ih and other players
use f−ih is not more than given ξik, k = 1, 2, · · · , ni.
All the players choose their strategies independently and want to mini-
mize their expected average cost from (25) subject to their constraints from
(26). We denote this constrained stochastic game by Gcea. The multi-strategy
fh = (f1h, f2h, · · · , fNh) is called i-feasible if it satisfies ith player’s con-
straints from (26) and it is called feasible if it is i-feasible for every i =
1, 2, · · · , N . Let F ξ denote the set of all feasible history dependent multi-
strategies and F ξS denote the set of all stationary feasible multi-strategies for
the constrained stochastic game Gcea. We shall assume throughout that F
ξ
S is
non-empty.
We now recall the definition of Nash equilibrium as given in [2]. A multi-
strategy fh∗ ∈ F ξ is called the Nash equilibrium of the constrained stochas-
tic game Gcea, if for each player i = 1, 2, · · · , N and for any f
ih such that
(f ih, f−ih∗) is i-feasible, one has that
Ciea(γ, f
h∗) ≤ Ciea(γ, f
ih, f−ih∗).
Thus, unilateral deviation by any player i, i = 1, · · · , N from equilibrium
strategy fh∗ is not possible, because in that case, either at least one of his
constraints will be violated or it will result in a cost for player i that is not
lower than the one achieved by feasible equilibrium strategy fh∗. A stationary
multi-strategy f∗ ∈ F ξS is said to be Nash equilibrium of constrained stochastic
game Gcea, if for each player i = 1, 2, · · · , N and for any f
i such that (f i, f−i∗)
is i-feasible, one has that
Ciea(γ, f
∗) ≤ Ciea(γ, f
i, f−i∗).
This can be seen by noticing that when all players j, j 6= i, fix their strategy
as a stationary strategy then player i is faced with a constrained Markov
decision process (CMDP) where optimal strategy always exists in the space of
stationary strategies [20].
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Assumptions [Altman, et al. [2]]
As similar to [2] we also have the following assumptions:
(A1) Ergodicity: For each player i, i = 1, · · · , N , and for any stationary strategy
f i the state process of player i is an irreducible Markov chain with one
ergodic class (and possibly some transient states).
(A2) Strong Slater condition: Every player i, i = 1, · · · , N has some strategy gi
such that for any multi-strategy f−i of other players,
Di,kea (γ, (f
−i, gi)) < ξik, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni.
(A3) The players do not observe their costs, i.e., the strategy chosen by any
player does not depend on the realization of the cost.
The last assumption is due to the definition of the strategies. If strategies were
allowed to depend on the realization of the costs, then a player can use the
cost to estimate other player’s states and actions. As the Nash equilibrium
exists in stationary strategies under the assumptions (A1)-(A3) [2], from now
onwards we restrict ourselves to the class of stationary strategies.
3.1 Average occupation measure
For each player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , using a stationary strategy f i and initial
distribution γi define the average occupation measure as
piiea(γ
i, f i) :=
{
piiea(γ
i, f i; si, ai) : si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si)
}
.
For all si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si), piiea(γ
i, f i; si, ai) is given by
piiea(γ
i, f i; si, ai) = pif
i
(si)f i(si, ai) (27)
where pif
i
=
(
pif
i
(1), pif
i
(2), · · · , pif
i
(|Si|)
)
is the unique steady state distri-
bution of Markov chain induced by strategy f i of player i, which exists under
(A1). piiea(γ
i, f i) can be considered as probability measure over Ki that as-
signs probability piiea(γ
i, f i; si, ai) to state-action pair (si, ai). The occupation
measure defined in (27) is unique and independent from initial distribution
γi, so, we drop γi from the notation. For any multi-strategy f ∈ FS the ex-
pected average costs for each player i, i = 1, 2, · · ·N , can be written in terms
of occupation measure as
Ciea(f) =
∑
(s,a)∈K

 N∏
j=1
pijea(f
j ; sj, aj)

 ci(s, a).
Di,kea (f) =
∑
(s,a)∈K

 N∏
j=1
pijea(f
j ; sj, aj)

 di,k(s, a), ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni.
Constrained stochastic games 29
Let Qiea, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , be the set of vectors x
i ∈ R|K
i| satisfying

∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
(
δ(si, s¯i)− pi(s¯i|si, ai)
)
xi(si, ai) = 0, ∀ s¯i ∈ Si
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
xi(si, ai) = 1
xi(si, ai) ≥ 0, ∀ si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si).
The space of stationary strategies is complete, i.e., the set of occupation mea-
sures achieved by history dependent strategies equals to those achieved by
stationary strategies and further equals to the set Qiea, i = 1, 2, · · · , N [20]. It
is known that for each (si, ai) ∈ Ki, xi(si, ai) = piiea(f
i; si, ai) where
f i(si, ai) =
xi(si, ai)∑
ai∈Ai(si) x
i(si, ai)
(28)
whenever denominator is nonzero (when it is zero f i(si) is chosen arbitrarily
from ℘(Ai(si))) [20].
We use the following notations throughout this section. For i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
• ui =
(
ui(1), ui(2), · · · , ui
(
|Si|
))T
.
• vi ∈ R.
• xi =
((
xi(1)
)T
,
(
xi(2)
)T
, · · · ,
(
xi
(
|Si|
))T)T
.
• xi(si) =
(
xi(si, 1), xi(si, 2), · · · , xi
(
si, |Ai(si)|
))T
.
• δi = (δi1, δ
i
2, · · · , δ
i
ni
)T .
The costs of player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , when he uses action ai at state si and
other players use f−i is defined as in [2],
ci(f−i; si, ai) =
∑
(s,a)−i∈K−i

 N∏
j=1;j 6=i
pijea(f
j ; sj , aj)

 ci(s, a).
di,k(f−i; si, ai) =
∑
(s,a)−i∈K−i

 N∏
j=1;j 6=i
pijea(f
j ; sj , aj)

 di,k(s, a), ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni.
3.2 Mathematical programming formulation
We show the one to one correspondence between the stationary Nash equilibria
of this game and the global minima of one mathematical program.
Best response linear programs
The best response of each player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , against fixed stationary
strategy f−i of other players is given by solving a constrained Markov decision
model, which, in turn, can be obtained by a linear program in our setting [20].
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The best response of player i against fixed strategy f−i of other players is
given by the linear program below:
min
xi
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
ci(f−i; si, ai)xi(si, ai)
s.t.
(i)
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
(
δ(si, s¯i)− pi(s¯i|si, ai)
)
xi(si, ai) = 0, ∀ s¯i ∈ Si
(ii)
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
xi(si, ai) = 1
(iii)
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
di,k(f−i; si, ai)xi(si, ai) ≤ ξik, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni
(iv) xi(si, ai) ≥ 0, ∀ si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si)


(29)
If xi∗ is the optimal solution of the linear program (29), then, the best response
f i∗ of player i can be obtained from (28) [20]. The dual of linear program (29)
is
max
vi,ui,δi
[
vi −
ni∑
k=1
δikξ
i
k
]
s.t.
(i) vi + ui(si) ≤ ci(f−i; si, ai) +
ni∑
k=1
di,k(f−i; si, ai)δik
+
∑
s¯i∈Si
pi(s¯i|si, ai)ui(s¯i), ∀ si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si)
(ii) δik ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni.


(30)
By using N primal-dual pair of linear programs given by (29), (30), we show
the one to one correspondence between the stationary Nash equilibria of con-
strained stochastic game Gcea and global minima of a mathematical program
[MP3]. Let ζT := (vi, (ui)T , (xi)T , (δi)T )Ni=1 and ψ(ζ) denote the decision
variables and the objective function of [MP3] respectively. ζT is a 1 ×
(
N +∑N
i=1 |S
i|+
∑N
i=1
∑
si∈Si |A
i(si)|+
∑N
i=1 ni
)
dimensional vector.
Theorem 3 (a) If (f i∗)Ni=1 is a Nash equilibrium of the constrained stochastic
game Gcea, then, there exists a vector ζ
∗T =
(
vi∗, (ui∗)T , (xi∗)T , (δi∗)T
)N
i=1
such that it is a global minimum of mathematical program [MP3] given
below
[MP3] min
ζ
N∑
i=1

 ∑
(s,a)∈K

 N∏
j=1
xj(sj , aj)

 ci(s, a)−
(
vi −
ni∑
k=1
δikξ
i
k
)

s.t.
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(i) vi + ui(si) ≤
∑
(s,a)−i∈K−i

 N∏
j=1;j 6=i
xj(sj , aj)

 ci(s, a)
+
ni∑
k=1
δik

 ∑
(s,a)−i∈K−i

 N∏
j=1;j 6=i
xj(sj , aj)

 di,k(s, a)


+
∑
s¯i∈Si
pi(s¯i|si, ai)ui(s¯i), ∀ si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si), i = 1, 2, · · · , N
(ii)
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
(
δ(si, s¯i)− pi(s¯i|si, ai)
)
xi(si, ai) = 0, ∀ s¯i ∈ Si, i = 1, 2, · · · , N
(iii)
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
xi(si, ai) = 1, ∀ i = 1, 2, · · · , N
(iv)
∑
(s,a)∈K

 N∏
j=1
xj(sj , aj)

 di,k(s, a) ≤ ξik, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni, i = 1, 2, · · · , N
(v) xi(si, ai) ≥ 0, ∀ si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si), i = 1, 2, · · · , N
(vi) δik ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni, i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
with ψ(ζ∗) = 0.
(b) If ζ∗T =
(
vi∗, (ui∗)T , (xi∗)T , (δi∗)T
)N
i=1
is a global minimum of [MP3] with
ψ(ζ∗) = 0 then (f i∗)Ni=1 is a Nash equilibrium of the constrained stochastic
game Gcea where,
f i∗(si, ai) =
xi∗(si, ai)∑
ai∈Ai(si) x
i∗(si, ai)
for all si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si), i = 1, 2, · · · , N whenever the denominator is
non-zero (when it is zero f i∗(si) is chosen arbitrarily from ℘(Ai(si))).
Proof (a) Let (f i∗)Ni=1 be a Nash equilibrium of the constrained stochastic
game Gcea. For each i = 1, 2, · · · , N , we construct occupation measures x
i∗
as in (27) corresponding to stationary strategies f i∗. Then, the constraints
in (ii), (iii) and (v) are satisfied by (xi∗)Ni=1. The multi-strategy (f
i∗)Ni=1 is
feasible because it is a Nash equilibrium, so the constraints in (iv) are also
satisfied by (xi∗)Ni=1. For each i = 1, 2, · · ·N , f
i∗ is best response of player i
against fixed strategy f−i∗ of other players; so, xi∗ as constructed above will
be optimal solution of linear program (29) for this fixed f−i∗ from Proposition
3.1(ii) of [2]. From strong duality theorem [24], [25] there exist optimal solution
(vi∗, ui∗, δi∗) of (30) such that the constraints in (i) and (vi) of [MP3] are
satisfied by (vi∗, ui∗, xi∗, δi∗)Ni=1 and objective function value of (29) and (30)
are same. In other words we have a point ζ∗T =
(
vi∗, (ui∗)T , (xi∗)T , (δi∗)T
)N
i=1
which is feasible for [MP3] and
∑
(s,a)∈K

 N∏
j=1
xj∗(sj , aj)

 ci(s, a) = vi∗ − ni∑
k=1
δi∗k ξ
i
k, ∀ i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
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From the construction of the objective function, ψ(ζ∗) = 0.
Let ζ be any feasible point of [MP3]. For each i = 1, 2, · · · , N , multiply
each constraint in (i) of [MP3] corresponding to pair (si, ai) ∈ Ki by xi(si, ai),
add over all (si, ai) ∈ Ki and by then using the constraints (ii)-(vi) we have
∑
(s,a)∈K

 N∏
j=1
xj(sj , aj)

 ci(s, a) ≥ vi − ni∑
k=1
δikξ
i
k, ∀ i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (31)
From (31) we have ψ(ζ) ≥ 0 for all feasible points ζ of [MP3]. Thus ζ∗ is a
global minimum of the [MP3].
(b) Let ζ∗ be a global minimum of [MP3] such that ψ(ζ∗) = 0. As ζ∗ is
a feasible point of [MP3] then (31) will also hold for ζ∗, i.e.,
∑
(s,a)∈K

 N∏
j=1
xj∗(sj , aj)

 ci(s, a) ≥ vi∗ − ni∑
k=1
δi∗k ξ
i
k, ∀ i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
From above we see that all N terms of the objective function are non-negative
at ζ∗. But at ζ∗ the objective function value is zero which means that all the
terms are individually zero, i.e.,
∑
(s,a)∈K

 N∏
j=1
xj∗(sj , aj)

 ci(s, a) = vi∗ − ni∑
k=1
δi∗k ξ
i
k, ∀ i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (32)
Fix ζ∗ and for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N , multiply each constraint in (i) correspond-
ing to pair (si, ai) ∈ Ki by xi(si, ai) and add over all (si, ai) ∈ Ki and by using
the constraints (ii)-(vi) and (32) we have for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N
∑
(s,a)∈K

 N∏
j=1
xj∗(sj , aj)

 ci(s, a) ≤ ∑
(s,a)∈K
xi(si, ai)

 N∏
j=1;j 6=i
xj∗(sj , aj)

 ci(s, a)
for all i-feasible (xi, x−i∗) . In other words we can say that for each i =
1, 2, · · · , N
Ciea(f
∗) ≤ Ciea(f
i, f−i∗), ∀ i-feasible (f i, f−i∗).
That is (f i∗)Ni=1 is Nash equilibrium of the constrained stochastic game G
c
ea
where
f i∗(si, ai) =
xi∗(si, ai)∑
ai∈Ai(si) x
i∗(si, ai)
for all si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si), i = 1, 2, · · · , N whenever the denominator is
non-zero (when it is zero f i∗(si) is chosen arbitrarily from ℘(Ai(si))).
Remark 4 It is easy to see that [MP3] is also a non-convex constrained opti-
mization problem.
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3.2.1 Special cases
We consider two special cases. First, we consider two player nonzero sum
constrained stochastic game as defined in Section 3, where, the constraints of
both the players are decoupled. Next, we consider two player zero sum game
as considered in [7].
(i) The case of two player game with decoupled constraints
Here we consider the situation where there are only two players and the con-
straints of each player do not depend on the strategies of the other player.
This is possible when immediate costs of each player which correspond to his
constraints do not depend on the state and actions of the other player, i.e.,
di,k(s1, s2, a1, a2) = di,k(si, ai) for all si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si), k = 1, 2, · · · , ni, i =
1, 2. We see that the mathematical program [MP3] reduces to a quadratic
program [QP3] as given below
[QP3] min
2∑
i=1

 ∑
(s1,a1,s2,a2)

 2∏
j=1
xj(sj , aj)

 ci(s1, s2, a1, a2)−
(
vi −
ni∑
k=1
δikξ
i
k
)
s.t.
(i) v1 + u1(s1) ≤
∑
(s2,a2)∈K2
c1(s1, s2, a1, a2)x2(s2, a2) +
n1∑
k=1
d1,k(s1, a1)δ1k
+
∑
s¯1∈S1
p1(s¯1|s1, a1)u1(s¯1), ∀ s1 ∈ S1, a1 ∈ A1(s1)
(ii) v2 + u2(s2) ≤
∑
(s1,a1)∈K1
c2(s1, s2, a1, a2)x1(s1, a1) +
n2∑
k=1
d2,k(s2, a2)δ2k
+
∑
s¯2∈S2
p2(s¯2|s2, a2)u2(s¯2), ∀ s2 ∈ S2, a2 ∈ A2(s2)
(iii)
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
(
δ(si, s¯i)− pi(s¯i|si, ai)
)
xi(si, ai) = 0, ∀ s¯i ∈ Si, i = 1, 2
(iv)
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
xi(si, ai) = 1, ∀ i = 1, 2
(v)
∑
(si,ai)∈Ki
di,k(si, ai)xi(si, ai) ≤ ξik, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni, i = 1, 2
(ix) xi(si, ai) ≥ 0, ∀ si ∈ Si, ai ∈ Ai(si), i = 1, 2
(x) δik ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , ni, i = 1, 2.
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(ii) Zero sum constrained stochastic game [7]
As a further special case of constrained stochastic game Gcea we consider two
player zero sum game with decoupled constraints [7]. This class of games with
both unichain and multichain structure on the state processes of both the
players can be solved by linear programs [7]. For zero sum case simply set
c1(s1, s2, a1, a2) = −c2(s1, s2, a1, a2) = c(s1, s2, a1, a2) for all s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2,
a1 ∈ A1(s1), a2 ∈ A2(s2) then the quadratic program [QP3] can be separated
into a primal-dual pair of linear programs which are same as given in [7] in
unichain case.
3.3 A numerical example
In this section we give one numerical example of a two player game where
constraints of both the players are decoupled. We compute the Nash equilib-
rium of this game by solving quadratic program [QP3]. The components of
the stochastic game are:
1. The state space of player 1 and player 2 are S1 = {1, 2}, S2 = {3, 4}
respectively.
2. The action sets of player 1 are A1(s1) = {1, 2} for all s1 ∈ S1 and action
sets of player 2 are A2(s2) = {1, 2} for all s2 ∈ S2.
3. The immediate costs of both the players, which are involved in their ex-
pected average costs they want to minimize, are given in Tables 3(a), 3(b),
3(c) and 3(d). These tables summarize the immediate costs of both the
Table 3 Immediate costs
(a) (s1, s2) = (1, 3)
P
P
P
P
P
P
a1
a2
a2 = 1 a2 = 2
a1 = 1 (2,3) (3,1)
a1 = 2 (4,2) (2,4)
(b) (s1, s2) = (1, 4)
P
P
P
P
P
P
a1
a2
a2 = 1 a2 = 2
a1 = 1 (5,2) (3,4)
a1 = 2 (3,2) (4,1)
(c) (s1, s2) = (2, 3)
P
P
P
P
P
P
a1
a2
a2 = 1 a2 = 2
a1 = 1 (3,5) (4,6)
a1 = 2 (5,2) (2,1)
(d) (s1, s2) = (2, 4)
P
P
P
P
P
P
a1
a2
a2 = 1 a2 = 2
a1 = 1 (4,5) (3,1)
a1 = 2 (1,2) (4,3)
players in all the possible states. For example in Table 3(a) the entry (2, 3)
represent 2 as immediate cost of player 1 when first player is in state 1 and
he chooses action 1 and second player is in state 3 and chooses action 1.
Similar explanation is for 3 and other entries in all the tables.
4. The transition probabilities of first and second Markov chains (one for each
player) are given in the Tables 4(a) and 4(b) respectively. We can easily
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check that both the Markov chains are unichain. In first Markov chain state
1 is transient for some strategies of player 1 and state 2 is recurrent for
every strategy f1 of player 1. In the second Markov chain both the states
3 and 4 are recurrent for every strategy f2 of player 2. So, the assumption
(A1) is satisfied.
Table 4 Transition probabilities of both the Markov chains
(a) p1(.|s1, a1)
a1 = 1 a1 = 2
s1 = 1 (0.5,0.5) (0.33,0.67)
s1 = 2 (1,0) (0,1)
(b) p2(.|s2, a2)
a2 = 1 a2 = 2
s2 = 3 (0.67,0.33) (0.4,0.6)
s2 = 4 (0.25,0.75) (1,0)
5. Each player has one constraint. The immediate costs of both the players
which are used in their expected average constraints are given in Table
5(a) and 5(b).
Table 5 Immediate costs defining constraints
(a) d1(s1, a1)
a1 = 1 a1 = 2
s1 = 1 7 4
s1 = 2 2 5
(b) d2(s2, a2)
a2 = 1 a2 = 2
s2 = 3 4 3
s2 = 4 3 5
6. The bounds defining the constraints are ξ1 = 5, ξ2 = 3.5.
We solve the quadratic program [QP3], corresponding to the above data, by
using MATLAB and obtain
ζ∗ = (1.2941, 0, 0, 1.7059,−0.5882, 0.5882, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0.2941, 0.7059, 0, 0, 0).
Note that at ζ∗ the objective function value is zero and hence it is the global
minimum of of [QP3]. We have x1∗ = (0, 0, 0, 1) and x2∗ = (0, 0.2941, 0.7059, 0)
then from Theorem 3 (b) the Nash equilibrium (f1∗, f2∗) of constrained stochas-
tic game Gcea, where
f1∗ = ((α, 1 − α), (0, 1)) for all α ∈ [0, 1]
f2∗ = ((0, 1), (1, 0))
Note that under f1∗ player 1 can use any randomized strategy at state 1 which
comes from the fact that state 1 is transient under f1∗. The costs of both the
players at Nash equilibrium (f1∗, f2∗) are
C1ea(f
1∗, f2∗) = 1.2941
C2ea(f
1∗, f2∗) = 1.7059.
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Appendix A
A single mathematical program for average and discounted cost criteria model
The mathematical programs [MP1] and [MP2] that characterize the stationary Nash
equilibria of single controller constrained stochastic games with average and discounted cost
criteria respectively can be recovered from one mathematical program [MP4] given below.
[MP4] min
η
[(
fTC1x−
(
1T z − (δ1)T ξ1
))
+
(
fTC2x−
(
v + (1 − β)γT u− (δ2)T ξ2
))]
s.t.
(i) v + u(s) ≤
[
(f(s))TC2(s)
]
a2
+
n2∑
l=1
δ2l
[
(f(s))TD2,l(s)
]
a2
+ β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a2)u(s′), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(ii) z(s) ≤
[
C
1(s)x(s)
]
a1
+
n1∑
k=1
δ1kd
1,k
sub(s, a
1), ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(iii)
∑
(s,a2)∈κ2
[
δ(s, s′)− βp(s′|s, a2)
]
x(s, a2) = (1− β)γ(s′), ∀ s′ ∈ S
(iv)
∑
(s,a2)∈κ2
x(s, a2) = 1
(v)
∑
(s,a1)∈κ1
d
1,k
sub
(s, a1)f(s, a1) ≤ ξ1k, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(vi)
∑
s∈S
(f(s))TD2,l(s)x(s) ≤ ξ2l , ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2
(vii)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
f(s, a1) = 1, ∀ s ∈ S
(viii) f(s, a1) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1(s)
(ix) x(s, a2) ≥ 0, ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2(s)
(x) δ1k ≥ 0, ∀ k = 1, 2, · · · , n1
(xi) δ2l ≥ 0, ∀ l = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
The mathematical program [MP1] can be obtained by putting β = 1 in [MP4]. For discount
factor β ∈ [0, 1) the constraint (iv) of [MP4] is redundant because it can be obtained by
summing (iii) over all s′ ∈ S and hence the variable v is also redundant. So, by removing
constraint (iv) and variable v from [MP4] we obtain [MP2].
